This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. He then distinguishes internal rationality from external rationality. The conclusion, which seems modest at first, is that if Christianity is true, Christians are warranted in their belief. There may still be a few things in life of which I am fairly certain, but atheism is no longer one of them. This is a fairly dense 500 pages of epistemology, theology, and general philosophy. This set of basic beliefs is identified with faith by Plantinga, though he unhelpfully uses the term ‘faith’ to denote both Christian belief and the process of forming that belief. Plantinga points out that neither Freud nor Marx offers much in the way of an argument for either of these claims, and each seems to presuppose the falsehood of theism. He adds in the instigation of the Holy Spirit to testify about more particular Christian doctrines. Granted they could come to believe on the basis of reasons and then graduate to believing basically—but why should the apostle commend such a scheme? societal, parental, etc.). He first argues that warrant is conferred to beliefs obtained via properly functioning faculties working according to some design plan in an environment congenial to their aiming at truth. The de jure objector must instead put forward. Plantinga discusses justification and rationality before concluding that the only promising candidate for a decent objection is the Freud/Marx complaint (mostly Freud) that Christian knowledge lacks warrant because it is merely a sort of wish fulfillment. The distinction between the “de jure (is it rational? Publication date 2000 Topics Apologetics, Christianity -- Philosophy, Faith and reason -- Christianity ... plus-circle Add Review. To see what your friends thought of this book, This is the third, and hence final, book in "the warrant trilogy." He claims that one who doesn’t believe in God has no reason to believe that his or her belief-producing faculties are reliable, and so has a defeater for every belief he or she holds. Plantinga then makes his major claim of the book: that the de jure objection to theistic or Christian belief is not independent of the de facto objection to theistic or Christian belief. Plantinga's main goal is to determine whether it is rational, intellectually acceptable, to hold Christian belief. A Review of Warranted Christian Belief by Alvin Plantinga. )” and “de facto (is it true? In this last book of a trilogy Plantinga lays down an argument for the defense of the warrant and rationality of Christian belief. Finally, the last part of the book deals with defeaters for Christian belief, and although they´re all very engaging, I personally think he completely failed even to take serious Michael Martin´s critique of the A/C model (the proposition of belief as basic), which I found disappointing because I think it´s the most important. )” and “de facto (is it true? This is the final volume of his trilogy on warrant, which he defines as that ‘quality or quantity, (perhaps it comes in degrees), whatever precisely it may be, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief’ (WCB, 153), following Warrant: The Current Debate (OUP, Oxford, 1993), hereafter WCD, and Warrant and Proper Function (OUP, Oxford, 1993), hereafter WPF. The central question in the philosophical field of religious epistemology is ‘In virtue of why is religious belief intellectually acceptable, if it is?’. 5 Favorites . Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief (WCB) examines the rationality of religious (particularly Christian) belief. Hence theistic belief has warrant, and, if held with sufficient strength and is true, constitutes knowledge. Using a hybrid Aquinas/Calvin model, Plantinga defines what exactly he means by Christian belief (teaser: the crux of the model is what Calvin terms the sensus divinitatis). It becomes very difficult to show that it is irrational because this requires showing that it is false. This document has been generated from XSL (Extensible Stylesheet Language) source with RenderX XEP Formatter, version 3.7.3 Client Academic. Plantinga begins by distinguishing two objections someone might have to theistic or Christian belief—the de facto objection that the belief is false and the de jure objection that the belief is intellectually unacceptable. Christian belief is therefore warranted, and, if held sufficiently strongly, warranted sufficiently to constitute, if true, knowledge. Turning to Freud and Marx on the other side, Plantinga distills all opposition to warranted theistic belief since Epicurus's eloquent paradox (what we call today the argument from evil) into two strains: fantasy or illusion that stems from our wish-fulfillment faculties; and external pressure (e.g. If one believes basically, one can’t truthfully give the reason on account of which one believes because there isn’t one. Roughly speaking, Christian belief is rational unless it is in fact false.